Abstract. Individual rankings are often aggregated using scoring rules: each position in each ranking brings a certain score; the total sum of scores determines the aggregate ranking. We study whether scoring rules can be robust to adding or deleting particular candidates, as occurs with spoilers in political elections and with athletes in sports due to doping allegations. In general the result is negative, but weaker robustness criteria pin down a one-parameter family of geometric scoring rules with the scores 0, 1, 1 + p, 1 + p + p 2 , . . .. These weaker criteria are independence from deleting unanimous winner (e.g., doping allegations) and independence from deleting unanimous loser (e.g., spoiler candidates). This family generalises three central rules: the Borda rule, the plurality rule and the antiplurality rule. For illustration we use recent events in biathlon; our results give simple instruments to design scoring rules for a wide range of applications.
Introduction
The 2014-2015 IBU Biathlon World Cup took place over a series of races in the winter of 2014/2015. At the end of each race the competitors were ranked in the order they finished, and assigned a number of points based on their position in that order. The scores for the first thirteen positions are 60, 54, 48, 43, 40, 38, 36, 34, 32, 31, 30, 29, 28 . The scores the athletes won are summed across the races, and the one with the highest score is declared the winner -a procedure that is known as a scoring rule.
The Women's Pursuit category consists of seven races. Kaisa Mäkäräinen came first with two first place finishes, two second, a third, a fourth, and a twelfth, for a total score of 348 points. Second was Darya Domracheva, with four first place finishes, one fourth, a seventh, and a thirteenth, for a total score of 347. In tenth place was Ekaterina Glazyrina, well out of the running with 190 points. These results are given in Table 1 . Four years later, Glazyrina was disqualified for doping violations, and all her results from 2013 were annulled. This bumped Domracheva's thirteenth place finish in race two into a twelfth, and her total score to 348. The number of first place finishes is used as a tie breaker, and in March 2019 it was announced that Mäkäräinen will be stripped of the Small Crystal Globe trophy in favour of Domracheva.
1 Because the tenth place competitor was disqualified for doping four years after the fact. Clearly there is something unsatisfying about this. We would hope that the relative ranking of Mäkäräinen and Domracheva depends solely on the relative performance of the two athletes, and not on whether or not a third party was convicted of doping, especially if said third party was not a serious contender for the title.
In this paper we will discuss a few classical results from social choice theory which describe why this is impossible, and suggest the best possible course of action left to us given the mathematical impossibilities we face. This involves introducing two extremely weak independence axioms, which turn out to characterise a one-parameter family of scoring rulesthe geometric scoring rules.
Suppose we have a set of m athletes and the results for n races, R 1 , . . . , R n . R i is the order in which the athletes finished race i. What we are after is a procedure which will transform the n race results into a single ranking for the entire competition, R: a function (R 1 , . . . , R n ) → R. We are not looking for an arbitrary function, but the end result R must reflect the results of the individual races in some way. A minimal condition is unanimity -if athlete a finishes ahead of athlete b in every race, we should expect a to rank above b in R. Motivated by the scenario in the introduction, we also want the relative ranking of a and b in the end result to depend only on the relative ranking of a and b in the individual races, a condition known as the independence of irrelevant alternatives. Here we hit the most famous result in social choice theory -Arrow's result that the only function that meets our criteria is dictatorship (Arrow, 1950) . Now, social choice theory is prone to colourful nomenclature, so it is important to underline that the characteristic feature of dictatorship is not jackboots and moustaches, but that all decisions stem from a single individual. In the case of a sporting competition, this could be the case where the first n − 1 races are treated as warm-ups or friendly races, and only the finals R n contributes to the final ranking R. This is not necessarily an absurd system, but it will not do if we want to keep viewers interested over the course of the event, rather than just the finals. We need to relax independence.
A weaker independence condition we may consider is independence of winners/losers, also known as local independence of irrelevant alternatives. As the name suggests, this is the condition that if we disqualify the top or the bottom athlete in the final ranking R, the remainder of the ranking remains unchanged. This could be a pressing issue if the winner is accused of doping, and a rule that satisfies this condition will guarantee that the cup is given to the runner up without requiring a retallying of the scores. In the case of the loser, there is the additional concern that it is a lot easier to add a loser to a race than a winner, and if the authors were to take their skis off the shelf and lose ingloriously in the next Biathlon, one would hope that the standing of the real competitors would remain unaffected.
It turns out that, given some standard assumptions, there is a unique rule that satisfies this -the Kemeny rule (Kemeny, 1959; Young, 1988) . The procedure is rather complicated so we shall not describe it here -which is one of its disadvantages, sporting fans will have to accept the results produced by what is essentially a black box. It is also a difficult procedure computationally (Bartholdi et al., 1989) , so even working out the winner may not be feasible. But perhaps most damning of all is that it violates a property known as electoral consistency. Suppose a biathlete comes first in every category of the championship (sprint, pursuit, and so on). It is reasonable to require that a ranking procedure guarantees she will also come first overall. The Kemeny rule does not.
In fact, the only rules that guarantee electoral consistency are the scoring rules (Smith, 1973; Young, 1975) . It seems there is no alternative to the rules actually used in Biathlon, Formula One, the Tour de France, and other events in this format -but that is not necessarily a bad thing. Scoring rules are easy to compute and understand, and every additional result contributes to the overall ranking in a predictable way, all of which are very desirable for a sporting event.
We have seen that neither of the independence notions we have defined so far can apply here, but how bad can the situation get? The answer is, as bad as possible. A theorem of Fishburn (1981) shows that for any monotone decreasing series of scores whatsoever, it is possible to construct a sequence of race results such that if one athlete is removed the remaining order is not only changed, but inverted. So while Mäkäräinen may not be pleased with the current turn of events, there is a possible biathlon where after the disqualification of Glazyrina Mäkäräinen finished last, and Domracheva second to last. It is interesting to speculate whether the competition authorities would have had the resolve to carry through such a reordering if it had taken place.
Results
In order to motivate our final notion of independence, let us first consider why the results of the biathlon may not be as paradoxical as they may appear at first glance. After all, if we can't prevent violations of independence from taking place, we could at least have an explanation ready. Note that removing Glazyrina from the ranking in Table 1 changed the results of Domracheva but not of Mäkäräinen. In other words Mäkäräinen outperformed Domracheva when it came to beating Glazyrina, which edged her into first place, but since Glazyrina is no longer considered a valid competitor that edge is removed.
So suppose then that the removed athlete is symmetric in her performance vis-à-vis the others. In other words she either came last in every race, and is thus a unanimous loser, or came first, and is a unanimous winner. Surely disqualifying such an athlete cannot change the final outcome? Why, yes it can.
The results for the Women's Individual category of the 2013-2014 IBU Biathlon World Cup are given in the left panel of Table 2 . The event consists of two races, and Gabriela Soukalová came first in both, and is thus a unanimous winner, followed by Darya Domracheva, Anastasiya Kuzmina, Nadezhda Skardino, and Franziska Hildebrand. However, in the hypothetical event of Soukalová being disqualified the result is different: the recalculated scores are in the right panel of Table 2 . Domracheva takes gold and Kuzmina silver as expected, but Hildebrand passes Skardino to take the bronze. However, in contrast to the previous paradoxes, this is one we can do something about. By picking the right set of scores we can ensure that the unanimous loser will come last, the unanimous winner first, and dropping either will leave the remaining order unchanged.
Let us formalise our two axioms. An athlete is a unanimous loser just if the athlete is ranked last in every race. A scoring rule satisfies independence of unanimous losers if unanimous loser is ranked last in the overall ranking, and removing unanimous loser from every race leaves the overall ranking of the other athletes unchanged.
Symmetrically, an athlete is a unanimous winner when ranked first in every race. Independence of unanimous winners is satisfied if unanimous winner is ranked first in the overall ranking, and removing unanimous winner from every race leaves the overall ranking of the other athletes unchanged.
Before we proceed, we observe that the order produced by a scoring rule is invariant under scaling and translation, e.g. the scores 4, 3, 2, 1 produce the same order as 8, 6, 4, 2 or 5, 4, 3, 2. We will thus say that scores s 1 , . . . , s m and t 1 , . . . , t m are linearly equivalent if there exists an α > 0 and a β such that s i = αt i + β.
Next, observe that hitherto we have not been precise about how we go about recalculating the scores when an athlete has been dropped. The issue is that if we use the values s 1 , . . . , s m to score m athletes, if we remove an athlete we are left with m scores and m − 1 athletes. In principle we need another set of t 1 , . . . , t m−1 scores to score m − 1 athletes, though in practice most sporting events simply obtain the t i values by trimming the first sequence, i.e. t 1 , . . . , t m−1 = s 1 , . . . , s m−1 , and s m is dropped.
The intuition behind the following result is clear: t 1 , . . . , t k produces the same ranking of the first/last k athletes, if and only if it is linearly equivalent to the first/last k scores in the original system. What happens when we combine the two conditions? Given that we need not distinguish scores up to scaling and translation we can assume that the score for the last place, s m , is zero, and s m−1 = 1. The third-to-last athlete must then get a larger number of points than 1, say 1 + p. Now we have a sequence 0, 1, 1 + p, and we know it must be linearly equivalent to the sequence 1, 1 + p, s m−3 . Since the only way to obtain the second sequence from the first is to scale by p and add 1, it follows that s m−3 = 1 + p + p 2 and so on. The formula for the score of the jth position is s j = (p m−j − 1)/(p − 1). This gives us the following family of scoring rules.
Theorem 2. A scoring rule satisfies independence of unanimous winners and losers if and only if it is a generalised geometric rule. That is, it is defined with respect to a parameter p, and the score of the jth position is linearly equivalent to:
This narrow class includes three famous rules as boundary cases. As p approaches infinity, the first position dominates all the others and we have the generalised plurality rule, also known as the lexicographic voting rule or the medal count ranking. With p = 1 we have the Borda rule, proposed by one of the founders of the mathematical study of elections (de Borda, 1781). As p approaches 0, we have the generalised antiplurality rule.
Our results have straightforward generalisations. We can generalise independence from removing unanimous winner to independence from removing unanimous winning clique: when some k candidates take top k positions in each individual ranking, removing the clique should not affect the ranking. We can do the same for independence from removing unanimous losing clique. The geometric scoring rules satisfy both generalised criteria.
Discussion
Scoring rules are used in areas far beyond sports competitions. Many countries use scoring rules in political elections: most of them use plurality, while Slovenia, Nauru and Kiribati use non-plurality scores. The Eurovision Song Contest uses a scoring system to aggregate collective judgements of viewers from different nations. Universities across the world use scoring rules to elect members of student and faculty commities.
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It is likely that scoring rules are popular because of their simplicity. Yet the task of choosing a specific scoring rule for a given problem is a daunting one, as one must choose m numbers more or less arbitrarily. Some applications call for convex scores, as in case of competitions that favour exceptional performance and do not give much weight to failures. Other applications, such as ranking job candidates or, more generally, designing composite indicator for objects with multi-dimensional characteristics, require more balanced weighting while a failure in at least one dimension can be fatal; such applications call for concave scores.
The practical relevance of our paper is that if the reader accepts that our two axioms are desirable -and they are very natural axioms -then the problem is reduced to choosing a single parameter p. Despite this simplicity, the resulting family is very broad: not only it includes a continuum of convex and concave scores, but also the three of the most popular scoring rules: the Borda count, the generalised plurality and the generalised antiplurality.
Future research can be devoted to finding desirable axioms or specific applications that pin down a particular parameter p. The literature provides multiple characterisations of the Borda count, but convex and concave rules did not receive much attention yet.
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To our knowledge, in social choice theory this is the first characterisation not of a specific scoring rule, but of a non-trivial family. Similar umbrella-like results would also be interesting and desirable.
Having established that the scores must be strictly decreasing, consider s Let n = |n 1 | + n i . Construct a profile with 3n races and m athletes as follows.
If n 1 ≤ 0, then in n − n i races a has position 1 and b has position 2. In n i races a has position 1 and b has position i. In n races a has position 2 and b has position i. In −n 1 races a has position i and b has position 2. In n + n 1 races a has position i and b has position 1.
If n 1 > 0, then in n races a has position 1 and b has position i. In n i races a has position 2 and b has position i. In n − n i races a has position 2 and b has position 1. In n i + n 1 races a has position i and b has position 1.
In both cases there are m − k athletes who come last in the order a k+1 ≻ . . . ≻ a m in every race, and the other athletes are ranked arbitrarily.
Observe than in a profile so constructed athlete a finishes n times in positions 1, 2, i. Athlete b finishes first n + n 1 times, second n − n 1 − n i times, and ith n + n i times. The score of a is thus ns
